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Mr. Ibrahim Suffian Merdeka Centre for Opinion Research, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Reflections of the 2008 Malaysian 
General Election: Role of the Internet 
in Political Communications
Introduction 
The 2008 Malaysian General Elections produced a result that has since changed the political landscape 
of the country. The outcome of the elections were to a large part due to the confluence of issues and 
of personalities, one important factor that has emerged is the role played by the internet as a conduit 
for expressing public desire for political change. 
The Malaysian mainstream media, particularly the vernacular Malay and English presses as well as the 
electronic medium, are controlled by either the government via the free-to-air televisions channels 
operated by the Ministry of Information, or the private channels operated by companies with strong 
links to the ruling coalition. Malaysian general elections since independence in 1957 have always been 
won by the ruling coalition of the National Front, a coalition of thirteen parties that represent various 
ethnic groups across the country dominated by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). In 
the eleven general elections held between 1957 and 2004, the National Front had always retained 
at least two-thirds of the seats in the Parliament, allowing it to amend the constitution at will. At the 
onset of the election campaign in 2008, most pundits and analysts observing the Malaysian political 
process agreed that this election would be no different, and the National Front would win handsomely, 
as it had in 2004 when it gained 92% of the seats in parliament with 64% of the popular vote.
However, unseen by the masses and largely dismissed by National Front strategists were the impact 
of concerns over the economy and rising public resentment over its handling of the interests of its 
polyglot citizenry. These issues began transforming into a discourse which found a thriving environment 
in the new media. 
Overview of the Factors Influencing the 2008 Elections 
The 2007 Malaysian survey of the Asian Barometer Survey project found that the key election issues 
were voters’ perceptions of economic performance, leadership performance, management of inter-
ethnic interests and the capability of the opposition. 
Economic Performance 
Following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis the economy had shown signs of recovery and posted growth 
rates exceeding four percent between 2001 and 2005. By 2006 however, rising global oil prices and 
the ensuing increase in food prices forced the Malaysian government to rollback subsidies on essential 
items such and the successive increases in the price of fuel had a direct impact on the popularity of 
the government. 
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The chart below shows GDP growth and the Business Confidence Index from 2003 to 
end 2009. The 2008 elections took place prior to the end of the first quarter of 2008, 
before the precipitous drop caused by the recent financial crisis. 
Leadership
In October 2003, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi became prime minister after twenty two years 
of Dr. Mahathir. Abdullah enjoyed unparalleled public support in the wake of his 2004 
election victory, with approval ratings as high as of 91%. Abdullah’s honeymoon lasted 
18 months after which his popularity decreased as fuel and other consumer staple prices 
increased, and he came under verbal attack from Dr. Mahathir as well as increasing public 
criticism from among civil society. 
Managing Ethnic Interests
One enduring feature of Malaysian politics is the complex management of the interests 
of the many ethnic groups that make up its population. For five decades, the National 
Front coalition had achieve a modicum of success in occupying the middle space in the 
Malaysian political spectrum, balancing the specific interests of the ethnic based political 
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parties. Over time however, the perception has increased that too much power had been 
accrued in the office of the prime minister under the guise of fast-tracking development 
and decision-making, eventually eroding the effectiveness of institutions tasked with 
maintaining checks and balances. 
At the same time, efforts by UMNO to regain lost ground from the 1999 elections among 
Malays led to the perceptible rise of pro-Malay rhetoric and discourse over Ketuanan 
Melayu (loosely defined as Malay Supremacy). In the period leading to the 2008 elections, 
several incidents took place which raised public temperament including the discovery of 
a video showing a prominent lawyer fixing the appointments of judges, ‘body-snatching’ 
by Muslim administrative authorities, deaths in police custody and the demolition of 
temples on public land by state authorities. In late November 2007, a demonstration 
by the Hindu Rights Action Force was met with force and some of the organisers were 
detained under the Internal Security Act, resulting in an abrupt loss of ethnic Indian 
support for the National Front.
The opposition 
In the 2008, the Malaysian opposition came together in a fashion that was unlike in 
previous elections. All three parties came to joint understanding based on their reading of 
the public mood and developed a tacit understanding of their roles that influenced their 
strategy in meeting the oncoming elections. In addition, many opposition campaigners 
had established working arrangements on common campaigns prior to the election, 
including the protests on free and fair elections, fuel subsidies, and judicial independence. 
Also salient was the centrifugal role of Anwar Ibrahim in moderating the stances of senior 
leadership in DAP and PAS that created a framework for practical cooperation among the 
three parties, including a basic campaign platform that downplayed ideological issues. 
The result was that the campaign communications of the opposition were generally 
uniform, and targeted the key issues of the government’s handling of the economy and 
inflation, its treatment of minorities, and the erosion of public confidence in the judiciary, 
the police and the prime minister himself. 
Web Based Strategies 
The political campaigns’ presence on the web was dominated by the opposition parties 
of PKR, PAS and DAP. The ruling coalition’s footprint on the web was miniscule, despite 
investing in improved websites and recruiting ‘cybertroopers’ to counter pro-opposition 
messages. Using their web pages, but particularly the blogs of individual contesting 
candidates, opposition parties focused their communications on such target issues as 
high inflation, criminality, and corruption, as well as the prime minister’s lack credibility.
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The opposition also promoted a message of change anchored in a more equitable and practical redistribution 
of national wealth, the dismantling of monopolies, and a more responsible government. In the personality-
driven political environment of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim was portrayed as a genuine alternative leader and 
a person who, after serving six years in prison on trumped-up charges, was duly cleansed of his prior role 
in government. 
Anwar’s party, PKR, centred its campaign message almost solely around his persona. Inspired by the Turkish 
AK Party’s successful experience of promoting former Istanbul mayor Raccip Tayep Erdogan to win recent 
elections, PKR presented Anwar as a symbol and bearer of change. In cyberspace, Anwar’s blog featured 
prominently as a source of information about the party, his campaign speeches and commentaries on 
developing events. By taking the style of a ‘presidential campaign’, PKR was able to deflect criticisms about 
the party and its lack of experience or pool of established leadership. 
Application of Information Technology in the Elections 
The evidence clearly indicates that the opposition was clearly more 
prepared and deliberate in their approach in using the internet and 
other technology in their communication strategy than the ruling 
parties. Some of these include: 
Text Messages – short message services (SMS) was utilised to the 
maximum by campaigners in the opposition. Some elements within 
the opposition had developed a capacity to send targeted messages to 
individuals living in particular locations, and had the ability to inundate 
voters in a particular location with SMS blasts carrying various messages. 
These messages were utilised to inform voters about nearby events 
and to send teaser messages to get them to visit websites. On the eve 
of the election day, several tens of thousands of voters in targeted 
constituencies received a pre-recorded audio message by Anwar Ibrahim 
asking them to vote for change. 
Candidate Websites – numerous campaign websites sprouted 
in support of candidates, the majority of which were developed by 
opposition candidates. These websites carried information about the 
candidates and reported on events, and some also solicited donations. 
Some notable successes were online donation drives by blogger-turned 
candidate Jeff Ooi who raised tens of thousands of dollars online to win 
handsomely; and Badrul Hisham, running against the prime minister’s 
son-in-law, raised more than RM30,000 within a week. 
21
Party Media Portals – party sites such as Harakahdaily and Suara 
Keadilan became portals that made material available for subsequent 
duplication and transmission amongst the public. PAS developed a daily 
newsletter which carried the statements and reportage of campaign 
issues and events, which was widely distributed during the campaign 
by party activists. 
Supporter websites – in addition to party websites, a number of 
homepages operated by party activists and supporters also carried 
additional information and generated materials and leaflets that could 
be downloaded and distributed. 
Youtube and other video sites – the opposition was denied access 
to mainstream television networks and so relied upon video sharing sites 
like Youtube to showcase its events and speeches. A large quantity of 
user generated material found their way on Youtube, with one of the 
more popular video clips showing the Malaysian prime minister asleep 
at various public events. 
Distribution of Video Discs – an adaptation of the leaflet, the 
general election saw further widespread use of the video compact 
discs (VCDs) as a form of digital leafleting by campaigners from both 
sides. These VCDs were used to carry various forms of messages, from 
the typical introduction of a local candidate to the transmission of 
insidious material denigrating a particular candidate or party. During 
the campaign, activists likely linked to the National Front re-issued an 
old video purporting Anwar Ibrahim’s sexual scandal, but the impact 
was negligible as the material was nearly a decade old and had been 
discredited by the legal process which acquitted Anwar in 2004. On 
the other hand, a VCD by the interest group HINDRAF depicting the 
destruction of Hindu temples and homes of Malaysians of Indian descent 
by Malaysian local authorities proved pivotal in inflaming voter passions. 
Impact of Information Technology
The National Front ran its campaign defensively yet retained a hubristic 
outlook that assumed members of the public would simply accept what 
was handed to them. It underestimated the level of resentment and 
disillusionment latent within the Malaysian electorate. The National 
Front also failed to comprehend the reach and transmission network 
of opposition and dissident citizen communications. A post election 
survey conducted by the Merdeka Center, a polling organization, found 
that while more than 90% of Malaysians learned about the elections 
via the mainstream media, two-thirds also had access to secondary and 
alternative sources of information such the internet, leaflets, and activist 
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meetings. Although these alternative forms of communications were difficult to maintain 
over time and were largely aided by the huge mobilisation of volunteer resources, they 
nonetheless achieved a decisive impact in the outcome of the elections. Campaigners 
from the ruling party failed to comprehend the corrosive nature of the content of the 
material being transmitted on the internet and by secondary information networks on 
their legitimacy and standing in the eyes of the electorate. 
The use of information technology will be a permanent feature of election campaigns. 
Its potency will be fueled by the type and nature of issues at hand as well as the strategy 
adopted by the mainstream media. At the time of writing, the Malaysian mainstream 
media continues to resist further liberalisation, and television and radio networks remain 
wedded to the wishes of the National Front ruling coalition. The electorate has clearly 
become increasingly cynical of the mainstream media and its masters, as a Merdeka 
Center poll conducted in July 2008 found that only 25% of Malaysian voters felt that 
they had some trust in the political news coverage of the local mainstream media, with 
less than 10% expressing “strong trust” in the medium. 
Malaysia continues to invest in its broadband networks and as internet access continues 
to widen beyond the urban areas of the country political actors are now more empowered 
and better able to utilise these tools. The disparate opposition has coalesced into the 
People’s Alliance who now control five provincial governments. At the same time, the 
evolution of Malaysian politics is likely to continue apace as information becomes more 
freely available to the public. Along with an increasing young electorate – many of whom 
are likely to have Internet access – the promise is that this is merely the beginning of a 
wider role for ICT in Malaysian political and social discourse. ■
